The Allen Craig Theory

April 22, 2003, just a seemingly average game in April taking place between the league royalty St. Louis Cardinals and the progressively more exciting Washington Nationals.     You wouldn’t normally think there was much rivalry between these two teams.     It would seem no two teams could be more dissimilar.   Much has been told about the Expos downward spiral, trying unsuccessfully to compete for attention of Canadian sports fans, and only rewarding whatever fans they had with one first place finish, albeit in a season in which the playoffs were never actually played.    Ironically, the only time before 2012 that the Expos/Nationals made the playoffs was during another strike-shortened season, 1981.    Meanwhile the Cardinals have had exactly one last place finish since 1920, but have managed to rack up about a dozen titles since then.   Though last year perhaps the seeds of a rivalry were born in the playoff match-up between these two historically antithetic franchises.   

In game four of the League Division Season, with the Cardinals up 2 games to 1, bottom of the ninth,  score tied 1-1, Jayson Werth, the Nationals $126 million dollar man faced Cardinals righty Lance Lynn.    Pitch after pitch was fouled off, until Lynn, perhaps frustrated with facing the same man for 13 pitches threw a fastball trying to induce Werth to make contact and be done with.   Werth  did exactly that.   He made contact, and the at bat was over.   As was the game so it turned out.    The home run to left tied the series, leaving the hometown crowd feeling, if even for a moment, that $126 million may have been money well spent.  

Now, we all love baseball for those dramatic moments, watching a game-winning home run go slowly over the outfield wall.   The dramatic scene in the movie Moneyball where Scott Hatteberg hits the home run off of steroid-rat Jason Grimsley to win the A’s twentieth consecutive game is one of the movies’ great defining moments.   We never know when those events take place, and that’s what makes it so exciting.    But what made that moment even more thrilling, or perhaps more ‘surprising’ is who actually hit the home run.   Now Jayson Werth is a fine ball-player.  Good hitter, good fielder, swift-runner, solid on-base guy.   But Jayson Werth is hardly the definition of a ‘clutch’ hitter.  But we will get back to that.  

Game 5 of that playoff series between the Nationals and the Cardinals was one of the most thrilling playoff games in recent memory.   Bryce Harper, the 19-year old uber UBER phenom tripled home Jayson Werth off of Adam Wainright in the first inning, then homered off the perennial Cy Young candidate in the third inning.   Eventually, the Nationals took a 6-0 lead, which in most times would have been more than enough.    The Cardinals clawed back, pulling to within one run, then found themselves back down two, with the score being 7-5 going into the ninth off of Nationals closer Drew Storen.    Storen, a Stanford-graduate was bred to be a closer.   A high-school pitching star, he spent his entire college and minor league career as a closer, specifically for these exact moments.   And you know when you’re a kid and you are pretending to be in these dramatic situations, you find yourself “announcing” the pretend game that you are playing.   Well, that probably didn’t happen too often in the Storen house since his father Mark Patrick probably did that for him (as Mark Patrick of MLB Network Radio was actually born Mark Storen).    Plus adding to the dramatic moment was that Drew Storen’s high school teammate was in the stadium.  None other than Lance Lynn, the guy who gave up the home run to Jayson Werth in game 4.   Buddy, you can’t make this stuff up.

In the bottom of the ninth of game 5, with Storen on the mound, the Cardinals rallied for 4 runs, including a couple of dramatic clutch hits by infielders Daniel Descalso and Peter Kozma, two formerly unheralded players from the Cardinals 2007 MLB draft.   During that 9th inning, Cardinals first basemen Allen Craig struck out with one man out and Carlos Beltran on third.     Perhaps the strikeout was not as noteworthy as the homerun by the Nationals Werth in the prior game, but perhaps it could be considered just as surprising.    See, unlike Werth, Allen Craig is most assuredly considered to be a ‘clutch hitter’.

For sake of this piece, let’s consider a clutch hitter to be one who performs in situations with runners in scoring position, as well as situations in which there are two outs with runners in scoring position (RISP, 2 Out).   Yet if you were to do research on the existence of clutch hitting, you might find that some of the brightest minds of baseball research will say that it doesn’t exist.    And they may be right.     The writers say that for a person to be a truly clutch hitter that they would need to consistently perform in those situation year over year.    There is some merit to the need of seeing consistency before you call someone a ‘clutch’ hitter.    Very rarely do you see a ‘strikeout pitcher’ who gets 200k’s one year, and 110 the next.  They are called strikeouts pitchers for a reason.   Power hitters, same thing.     Yet if there were players who did perform year-in and year-out in ‘clutch’ situations would that debunk the theory that clutch hitting was a myth??    Maybe exceptions aren’t enough to do that, but anytime statistical analysis exposes a predictable trend it does make watching the game a bit more intriguing.  

A question that keeps popping up in my mind is one I need help trying to answer.   Is every hit valued equally??    Imagine a guy who hits .500 whenever his team is up or down 4 runs or more, or a player who hits .400 when no one is on base, but .100 when runners are on base.   Each of these hitters can end up with a .330 batting average, but should they be considered productive hitters??    Yes, these are unrealistic scenarios, but it’s just as unrealistic to assume players can hit for the same general batting average in every situation.     (However there are exceptions to even that, such as Tony Gwynn who was an exceptional hitter regardless of the game situation.)

Allen Craig is one of those rare players, who thus far in his 4 year career has shown to be a consistent producer in such ‘clutch’ situations.    Let’s examine:

 

2010 Batting Average     .241

2010 BA RISP                      .258

2010 BA RISP, 2 Out         .250

 

2011 Batting Average     .315

2011 BA RISP                      .316

2011 BA RISP, 2 Out         .333

 

2012 Batting Average     .307

2012 BA RISP                      .400

2012 BA RISP, 2 Out         .313

 

 

On the surface, it looks like a minor differential between Craig’s batting average and his average in clutch situations.    In fact, let’s be realistic; it is a minor differential.   Also, note that Allen Craig was not a true regular until 2012.   His at bat totals for 2010 through 2012 were 114, 200, and 469.  However note the following.    Of all players who had 75 or more at bats each year between 2010 and 2012, only 19 players had batting averages with RISP and 2 outs higher than their overall batting average in each of those 3 years.    Allen Craig is one of those 19, but he’s also the only one to have an overall batting average of .300 in the group.  

 

The player with the greatest differential  between their overall average and their ‘BA RISP, 2 Out’ is, yep, you guessed it…. Paul Janish.   Paul freakin’ Janish. 

 

2010 Batting Average     .260

2010 BA RISP                      .386

2010 BA RISP, 2 Out         .318

 

2011 Batting Average     .214

2011 BA RISP                      .217

2011 BA RISP, 2 Out         .333

 

2012 Batting Average     .186

2012 BA RISP                      .231

2012 BA RISP, 2 Out         .286

 

What makes Paul Janish’s batting average go up almost 100 per year during those tense at bats I’m sure I don’t know.   And if you ask Bill James he will say it’s a myth, a small-sample size, an anomaly, or something other than a reliable statistical event.    But now let’s go back and review the hero of game 4 of the 2012 National League Divisional Series, Mr. Jayson Werth.

 

2010 Batting Average     .296

2010 BA RISP                      .186

2010 BA RISP, 2 Out         .139

 

2011 Batting Average     .232

2011 BA RISP                      .229

2011 BA RISP, 2 Out         .179

 

2012 Batting Average     .300

2012 BA RISP                      .250

2012 BA RISP, 2 Out         .176

 

 

Look at those declines!!   A 50 point average decline with RISP and a 110 point decrease in RISP, 2 out.   Statistical anomaly my ass.   Anyone who thinks this is a not a reliable statistical trend can, as they would say in Montreal…  embrassez mes boules.    Many people were shocked when the Nationals offered Jayson Werth such a massive contract.    Yes, he’s a fine ballplayer, but for $126M I imagine a team would expect a player to perform better in those situations.   The ole expression of ‘he never comes through in the clutch’ is often based upon the fan’s experience in watching a team over the course of a season, or seasons.   But yet a simple statistical review can show what the intelligent fan already has witnessed.   Yes it was great to see Werth hit that home run in game 4, but recall that there were no outs, and no one on base.    Over the last 3 year, Jayson Werth is a .293 hitter with no one on base.  He just also happens to be a .240 hitter with men on base, .215 with runners in scoring position, and a miserable .160 with two outs and RISP.

 

 

On the other side of the spectrum, Ryan Zimmerman is the most consistent differential producer in such situations:

 

2010 Batting Average     .307

2010 BA RISP                      .313

2010 BA RISP, 2 Out         .365

 

2011 Batting Average     .289

2011 BA RISP                      .293

2011 BA RISP, 2 Out         .368

 

2012 Batting Average     .282

2012 BA RISP                      .266

2012 BA RISP, 2 Out         .327

 

This shows that Zimmerman batting average each year goes up about 50 points in two-out situations with Runners in Scoring Position.   Now I realize that the spread would be bigger if I was to back out plate-appearances with no runners on base, but I’m trying to keep this analysis light and moderate.

 

I understand that many brighter minds than mine have done a greater level of research to prove the reliability of such trends, but I’m simply not convinced.  I watch enough baseball to realize it IS a game in which emotions can greatly affect performance.    Look at the following two comparisons:

Alex Rios

2010 Batting Average     .284

2010 BA RISP                      .306

2010 BA RISP, 2 Out         .379

 

2011 Batting Average     .227

2011 BA RISP                      .171

2011 BA RISP, 2 Out         .075

 

2012 Batting Average     .304

2012 BA RISP                      .348

2012 BA RISP, 2 Out         .233

 

Torii Hunter

2010 Batting Average     .281

2010 BA RISP                      .297

2010 BA RISP, 2 Out         .323

 

2011 Batting Average     .262

2011 BA RISP                      .279

2011 BA RISP, 2 Out         .231

 

2012 Batting Average     .313

2012 BA RISP                      .344

2012 BA RISP, 2 Out         .426

 

 

Oh we could have a field day with this.   In 2011 the White Sox were a mess.   Adam Dunn joined the team and couldn’t hit Tim Collins’ weight.   Ozzie Guillen lost control, and his “managerial magic” finally ran out.   I question that he ever had it.   An entertaining chap, but he clearly unraveled, and has continued to do so.   Alex Rios had no ability to pick up the slack, and his already lackadaisical approach slid deeper and deeper until had had zero motivation to get anything out of his God-given talent.    He was 4 for 53 with RISP, 2 Outs.    The man was making $12,500,000 in 2011, and in 53 plate appearances with two outs and RISP managed 3 singles and one double.   That’s it.    In 2012, under new White Sox manager Robin Ventura, Rios had a nice bounce back year, but still under-performed in those situations. 

 

Torii Hunter on the other hand truly elevated his game in 2012.   It didn’t hurt that Hunter was hitting behind Trout and ahead of Pujols.    But at 36, Hunter was playing for a new contract, and he did pick a heck of a time to hit .300 for the first time in his 15-year career.     Hunter historically in his career hit a home run every 25 at-bats, and 61% of his hits were singles.  Last year he hit a homer ever 33 at bats, and 75% of his hits were singles.   Plus as you see his performance in the clutch sky-rocketed.   All in all, a very solid and perhaps ‘smart’ change to his hitting approach landed the 37 year old a brand new $26 million dollar contract with the Tigers.

But now let us return to how the article started.    The day before the April 22^nd game between the Cardinals and Nationals, it’s Sunday April 21^st my buddy Earl and I were having a discussion on our weekly podcast “Just Talking to the Cornfield”, and as is usually the case, were are in the midst of a debate in which he eventually wins.   I am discussing what I call “The Allen Craig Theory” of how players can perform in higher-pressure situations.   I have prepared for the discussion by compiling some statistical evidence, including the fact that since 1960 the player with the highest career batting average with RISP is Mr. Craig, (see the top 10 below):

 

Highest Career Avg (RISP, minimum 200 AB’s with RISP)

Player                                   Career Avg                          Career RISP                        Differential

Allen Craig                           .296                                        .357                                        +.061

Joey Votto                          .315                                        .351                                        +.036

Tony Gwynn                      .338                                        .349                                        +.011

Joe Mauer                          .322                                        .343                                        +.021

Rod Carew                          .328                                        .339                                        +.011

Roberto Clemente          .317                                        .337                                        +.020

Albert Pujols                      .324                                        .336                                        +.012

So Taguchi                           .279                                        .331                                        +.052

Miguel Cabrera                 .319                                        .329                                        +.010

Adrian Gonzalez               .295                                        .329                                        +.034

 

 

Sure enough, 7^th inning, with one out and runners on 1^st and 3^rd, Allen Craig lines a single to LF off of Phili reliever Chad Durbin to give the Cardinals a 3-2 lead.    Buster Olney tweets:

 

Buster Olney‏@Buster_ESPN21 Apr  And the Cardinals with another hit in RISP... More damage from Allen Craig...

And yes I’m feeling good about my theory.   Now let’s move onto that April 22^nd game between the Cardinals and Nationals.  There is no score in the 3^rd inning, but the Cardinals have men on 1^st and 2^nd two outs.  Allen Craig comes through, hitting a double to left field, two runs in.    Later in the game, 8^th inning, the speedy Nationals outfielder Denard Span has led off with a single.   It’s a 3-2 game, and Werth simply has to get that runner to 2^nd base.  If he can’t knock him in, he has to at least get him into scoring position.   Yet, he strikes out leaving the runner at 1^st.   Cardinals win 3-2

 

Next game, 0-0 in the fourth inning, Shane Robinson of the Cardinals leads off with a single, Allen Craig doubles him home and the Cardinals take the lead.  In the sixth inning, Washington has men on 1^st and 3^rd, one out, Jayson Werth comes up.  The score is now 2-0 Cardinals.  Jayson Werth sees one pitch, and pops it up to second base.    No grounder to score the runner, no sac fly, no walk, just a one-pitch pop up, runners are stranded.  Eighth inning, same game, score is still 2-0 Cardinals, and once again Denard Span is on base, this time he’s at 2^nd after a wild pitch.  Jayson Werth hits a soft ground ball to shortstop, Cardinals win 2-0.

 

April 24^th, third game of the series, Cardinals jump to a quick 3-0 lead against Strasburg, but in the 6^th the Nationals have a rally.   Strasburg, the pitcher trying to help his cause leads off with a single.  Denard Span follows that with another single.   Jayson Werth is up, with no outs and 2 men on base.    He promptly hits a ground ball to the Cardinals pitcher, who goes to first to retire Werth.    Cardinals win 4-2.   Yes later that game Werth hits a stat-padding solo shot to make it a 4-2 game.   But in pressure situations, with runners on front of him, he has failed to deliver, as is often the case.

 

Statistical anomaly, unpredictable trend.  Say what you will.  In 2013, Jayson Werth is hitting .275, but only .240 with RISP and .091 (1-11) with RISP, 2 Outs.   Allen Craig by comparison is hitting .262, sure it’s a lower overall average when compared to Werth.  But Allen Craig is also hitting .440 with RISP, and a ridiculous .636 (7-11) with RISP, 2 Outs.     Jayson Werth is making $16 million this year, Allen Craig, $1.75 million.    This would be a great time to mock the name “werth” as in who is “werth” their money.   But nah.    Let’s keep it straight.   Fact is, Allen Craig has probably been playing fearlessly since he was a kid.   He hit a home run in his first college at bat, and for those two don’t remember, he came off the bench as a pinch-hitter in games 1 and 2 of the 2011 World Series, and delivered singles in the ole RISP, 2 Out situation becoming the only player with 2 go-ahead RBI’s as a pinch hitter in the history of the World Series.   And these were his first two at-bats in World Series play.    So I ask you again.  Is this an unpredictable trend, or perhaps is there something to “The Allen Craig Theory”.    They say time always tells, but time has already told us.

 

 

And the NL MVP is..... Chris Nelson??!!

About two weeks ago I was doing something that I've reluctantly done from time to time.   Driving home from work, I wasn't in the mood to fidget with my Sirius receiver, in hopes of finding the perfect cruising song.  Something along the lines of "Tommy Tucker" by Moe or just about anything from Umphrey's McGee will help me pass the time.   Knowing all to well that I'd end up with something far less enjoyable I dared turn on New York sports radio.    Now granted, me and my pal The Big Earlbowski do our own little weekly ditty on the internet via talkshoe, but we rarely drone on for 45 minutes about whether or not Joe Girardi should have pinch hit for Jayson Nix in the 6th inning, or whether Terry Collins stuck with a starter one batter too long.   Those conversations may be fun to have with your friends, or over lunch, but the empty content that's so often on the 'big' radio shows just makes it brutal to listen to.   Not to mention the great societal contributors who call in with questions like.... "Hey I'd like to tawk 'bout da Mets.   So, um, what do yoo tink 'bout da Mets??"   And while I've traveled here and there and listened to sports radio in about 20 different states, only in the Steinbrenner-infused twisted minds of Yankee fans will you hear caller after call propose trades like "Supposen the Yankees can package a guy like Brett Gardner with a young pitcher like Ivan Nova, to the Dodgers for Matt Kemp and Clayton Kershaw.   That could really help dem out."    However, amidst the painful rhetoric, one caller made a comment that sent my mind off into a lovely green pasture full of ..... well, I guess full of baseball stats.    For about the 8000th time, a caller stated how 'bad' Alex Rodriguez is at driving in runs, and as usual the person was tossing around those horrible definitive terms such as "he never...." and "every time he....."   Using such concrete words annoys me to such a degree, simply because as a person who enjoy statistics as much as I do once someone uses one of those words I immediately tune them out as whatever statement they are making must be wrong.    And yet even I accept that being 'wrong' doesn't necessarily mean anything concrete either, as can be explained by this scene from the "Big Bang Theory":

Sheldon: I've spent the last 3 hours in an online debate in the DC Comics Batman chatroom and I need your help.

Stuart: Oh yeah, those guys can be very stubborn, what's the topic?

Sheldon: I am asserting: in the event that Batman's death proves permanent, the original Robin, Dick Grayson, is the logical successor the Batcowl.

Stuart: Ooh, Sheldon, I'm afraid you couldn't be more wrong.

Sheldon: "More wrong"? Wrong is an absolute state and not subject to gradation.

Stuart: Of course it is; it's a little wrong to say a tomato is a vegetable, it's very wrong to say it's a suspension bridge.

As is often the case, I accept that I can be wrong.   Merely look at the title of this piece and it doesn't take much to see how wrong I can be.   Chris Nelson, the Rockies third basemen, for MVP??  He has a .290 / 9 /47 slash, doesn't even play full-time, and is a below average defender.    Of course he can't be MVP.  Yet Chris Nelson does something better than anyone in the National League, and if it wasn't for that drive home from work two weeks ago, and that inane callers empty comment, I may never have known about it.

Before I go off onto this journey, I want to share a story that my brilliantly entertaining co-host Earl ( @verdantdude ) shared on our show once or twice. 

The story goes that in 1925, at the age of 38, Ty Cobb was speaking with a reporter, and expressing his disdain for all the attention that sluggers such as Babe Ruth were receiving.   Cobb, considered his "style" of playing baseball to be more strategic or perhaps scientific, and that he could hit home runs "whenever he wished".   To back up his boast, Cobb went out and had himself a 6-6 day, including 3 home runs.  He then followed it up with 2 more home runs the next day.  Point proven, Cobb returned to his prior approach to hitting.    Of course it should be noted that many writers including ESPNs Dave Schoenfield will look to refute this story, but any true fan of baseball can accept a little "Lie Within the Lore".   As someone once said, if the amount of people who said they were at the game when Maris hit homer number 61 they'd have had to have added a few hundred-thousand seats in Yankee Stadium to accommodate them all.

No one can discount Cobb's mastery as a hitter and even if the story wasn't true, it probably could be true.  Using a more contemporary example, there are countless stories of Ichiro Suzuki mechanically drilling home run after home run in batting practice, only to return to his own "style" of baseball during the game.  He himself explained it in a New York Times piece, and the reasoning sounds eerily familiar to the Cobb story:

"Chicks who dig home runs aren't the ones who appeal to me. I think there's sexiness in infield hits because they require technique. I'd rather impress the chicks with my technique than with my brute strength. Then, every now and then, just to show I can do that, too, I might flirt a little by hitting one out."

Unbeknownst to many fans is the fact that Ichiro, the man with the sweet left-handed swing that produced over 3,800 hits in Japan and the United States is actually a natural right-handed hitter.  He taught himself to be a full-time left-handed hitter to be 2 steps closer to first base, which was better suited for his hitting method.

I bring all this up, because these 'strategic' hitters, much like a world class poker player, are often looking for that advantage or the "tell".   And hitting with runners on base is likely more advantageous to the hitter than hitting with the bases empty.  The pitchers focus is split, the infielders are leaning one way or the other, the outfielders are taking extra steps, perhaps not always the right way.   In Ichiro's first season with the Mariners he proved he was able to exploit these weaknesses better than anyone as his batting average with the bases empty was .313, yet in 137 at bats with runners on base (ROB) he hit an amazing .420.   With runners in scoring position (RISP) his average rose to a remarkable .445.   With numbers like that its not at all surprising that Ichiro won the MVP.   But lets examine a bit deeper.

In 2001, Ichiro had the following at bats:

59 times with a runner at 2nd base
29 times with runners at 1st and 2nd
18 times with runners at 1st and 3rd
8 times with runners at 2nd and 3rd
12 times with a runner on 3rd
11 times with bases loaded

Subtracting for home runs (in which he effectively knocked himself in), in the above at bats Ichiro had 61 RBI, or what I call BKI (Baserunners Knocked-In).    Thus, Ichiro had at bats (i.e. not including walks) with 315 runners on base, including 156 in scoring position and he had 61 BKI.   That equates to 19% of the runners on base and 39% of the runners in scoring position.   Numbers like that are equivalent to the 2012 production of.... nope, not Ryan Braun, not Miguel Cabrera, and not even Joey Votto.... but of..... say Coco Crisp.

Now I'm not trying to say Ichiro wasn't an amazing player.  His offensive abilities and his defensive prowess are world-class, yet as the object of baseball is to merely outscore your opponent.  However all the hits that Ichiro had in 2001 weren't as productive as one may think.   Its hard to fathom that that such a ridiculous batting average with RISP of .445 wouldn't lead to record-breaking production.    Of course my first thought is that most of his hits were singles that didn't score runners from second or doubles that didn't score runners from first, and that may be the case.   But the point of this piece is NOT to discount the amazing achievement of certain players like Ichiro, yet rather its to point out those that are producing beyond what you may otherwise see in the leaderboards.

Case in point, John Jaso of Seattle.    The first thing that I think of when his name comes up is his OBA skills.   Good catcher, generally hit about 25 doubles and 12 HR in the minors, and he's got close to a .400 on-base % this year, so his pitch recognition skills are surely above average.   Yet I don't think of him as an RBI guy.   He's not a full-time player as yet, and he's still 6th or 7th on his team in RBIs, while manager Eric Wedge keeps rolling out Miguel Olivo and his .228 OBA.   That's right..... the starting catcher in Seattle has an OBA about half that of Jaso.    Yet OBA is surely not the only skill that Jaso possesses.     Last year in Tampa, the young catcher hit a pitiful .167 with RISP.   Though young and talented, Tampa traded him to Seattle for Josh Lueke, a pitcher one accused, and generally convicted of and sent to jail for rape while in the Texas organization.   So while Lueke had an awful season in the minors and in his 3 awful innings in Tampa, Jaso seemingly used his pitch-recognition skills to drive in runs in key situations.   He's hitting .394 with RISP and in plate appearances with a runner at 3rd or with runners at first and third he's hitting .667.   But ok, its only 18 at bats..... yet in those at bats he's had 27 runners on base and 18 in scoring position and he has 19 BKI (again..... base-runners knocked in).   All told, the catcher with the good-eye who was traded for a convict has a 22% TROB (scoring 22% of all runners on base when he is at bat) and 48% TRISP (scoring 48% of all runners in scoring position when he is at bat).

At this point, those numbers may not mean much because you probably need some comparisons.   So for 2012, here goes:

John Jaso - 22% TROB / 48% TRISP
Prince Fielder - 23% TROB  /  52% TRISP
Adrian Beltre - 18% TROB /  38% TRISP
Mike Trout - 21% TROB / 41% TRISP
Derek Jeter - 15% TROB / 28% TRISP
Bryce Harper - 12% TROB / 26% TRISP

(TROB = Total runners knocked in that were on base during a players at bat)
(TRISP = Total runners knocked in that were in scoring position during a players at bat)


And for those Yankee fans who cry that A-Rod is "the worst clutch hitter ever!!", well, he's not the worst, but for the money............

Alex Rodriguez - 14% TROB / 28% TRISP

Not too spectacular.   Yet in the midst of a great season his teammate.....

Robinson Cano - 13% TROB / 32% TRISP

Not much better.   Lets have some more fun looking at the incredibly consistent Robby Cano:


2010:  626 AB, 41 Doubles, 29 Homers, .319 average
2011:  623 AB, 46 Doubles, 28 Homers, .302 average
2012:  572 AB, 42 Doubles, 30 Homers, .297 average

Simply amazing stats for any hitter, but even more impressive for a gold glove caliber 2B.   Hard to be more consistent than that.   But how about if I throw in one more stat:

2010:  109 RBI
2011:  118 RBI
2012:  78 RBI (on pace for 84)

And here's why:

2010:  20% TROB  / 40% TRISP
2011:  23% TROB / 51% TRISP
2012:  13% TROB / 32% TRISP

Quite simply Cano is just not driving in runners in those situations as he has in the past.  So while his overall numbers are consistent, he's simply not being as "productive".

And that brings us to Mr. Nelson and his NL Leading 25% TROB.

Yeah, Chris Nelson is leading the National League in knocking in the most runners (BKI) who are on base (TROB) when he receives an at-bat.   Sure it may only be a point or so higher than players like Mauer, David Ortiz, Cargo and Fielder..... but you'd expect solid production in key situation from those hitters.  Yet Chris Nelson..... probably not the first guy that comes to mind.    Nelson's numbers, just like Cano's, show that productivity isn't something that can be seen by looking at ones overall stat line.   And Ichiro's RISP number in his MVP season also shows that productivity is a bit more complex than what a single stat can show.    The classic definition of productivity means generating more output with the same, or lesser, input.   Nelson's 2012 season is therefore a very productive one.   Surely a lot more than people recognize.

Here are a few other players whose TROB and TRISP numbers stand out:

Kyle Seager -22% TROB / 42% TRISP - (similar to teammate Jaso he's having a productive year)
Paul Konerko - 15% TROB / 36% TRISP - (I expected a bit higher rate)
Brandon Inge - 21% TROB / 40% TRISP - (amazing for a .226 hitter)
Giancarlo Stanton - 18% TROB / 41% TRISP - (Puts Inge in perspective??)

The Best:

Joey Votto - 64% TRISP
Josh Hamilton - 28% TROB

Special Mention:
Miguel Montero - 24% TROB / 55% TRISP


And of course..... The Worst:
Dernard Span - 13% TRISP

Zack Cozart - 7% TROB

Special Mention:
Jeff "WTF" Francouer - 10% TROB  / 23% TRISP


For fun I decided to take a look at some of the games most well-regarded clutch hitters (all career numbers):

Willie McCovey - 20% TROB / 44% TRISP
Eddie Murray - 19% TROB / 43% TRISP
Roberto Clemente - 19% TROB / 41% TRISP

And for all of his opinion of who should make the Hall of Fame:
Reggie Jackson - 18% TROB / 39% TRISP

To put Jackson in perspective, his numbers show that Eddie Murray, who had a well-earned reputation as a "clutch" hitter, knocked in 120 more runs in similar situations as Mr. October.  

Jacksons numbers are more in line with another 'underperformer'
Jermaine Dye - 17% TROB / 36% TRISP

Yet even Jermaine Dye's performance far outpaces the worst of the so-called "power hitters".   Though he had a rather short career of 9 seasons, Richard Hidalgo had 20 home runs in 4 of them including 44 in 2000, however he ended up with a 16% TROB and a 33% TRISP.


Other players of note:

Pat Tabler, who famously had a .489 career batting average with the bases load.    Yet even that only pushed his career numbers to:   18% TROB / 37% TRISP.   But please note, those career numbers are actually very good for a player who wasn't known as a power hitter.

Rennie Stennett is known as the only player since 1900 to get 7 hits in a non-extra inning game.   However the Pittsburgh infielder should be known for something else, as he has the highest spread of batting average with Runners in Scoring Position (RISP) compared to at bats with no RISP.    Stennett hit .312 with RISP compared to .263 in other at bats, a difference of .049.   On the opposite side of the spectrum is another former Pittsburgh player Al Martin, who surely was not a bad player, evidenced by 6 seasons in which he hit over .280.    Yet for some reason with runners in scoring position Martin had a career batting average of only .242 (see the comparison below).



Al Martin - 4,242 AB  132 Home Runs,  .276 / .339 / .444
Rennie Stennett - 4,521 AB   41 Home Runs, .274 / .304 / .359

You would think that the guy with the 91 more home runs and almost a 100 points higher in his slugging percentage would be so much more productive.   However, here is one more stat:

Al Martin - 485 RBI
Rennie Stennett - 432 RBI

A lot closer than the basic stat line would suggest.... and here's why:

Al Martin - 15% TROB / 31% TRISP
Rennie Stennett - 17% TROB / 43% TRISP

The primary difference is clearly the percentage of runners knocked in (BKI) with runners in scoring position (TRISP).  And just for fun, lets compare the light-hitting Rennie Stennett to some of the games greats

Rennie Stennett - 17% TROB / 43% TRISP
Eddie Murray - 19% TROB / 43% TRISP
Roberto Clemente - 19% TROB / 41% TRISP
Reggie Jackson - 18% TROB / 39% TRISP

That's production Rennie!!

Awwww, he looks embarrassed. 

And finally..... who are the best hitters.   The men who knocked in the most runners who were on base when they were at bat (TROB) or who knocked in the most runners when at bat with runners in scoring position (TRISP).  [Please note that complete data on players like Gherig, Ruth, Dimaggio, Williams were not available.   In addition, I do not include players like Bonds or Manny for 'obvious' reasons.]   So.......... here are....

The BEST:

First, the Colorado boys (dilute if you wish):
Helton - 22% TROB / 47% TRISP
Walker - 20% TROB / 44% TRISP

And now that that's out of the way.........

6) Mo Vaughn - 21% / 43%
5) Mike Sweeney - 21% / 43% (How 'bout that!!)
4) Willie McCovey - 20% / 44%
3) Willie Mays - 19% / 46%
2) Hank Aaron - 20% / 46%

And if you didn't know, ya SHOULDA known.

1) Mickey Mantle - 20% / 47%


With Mantle, there is so often a bit of lie within the lore.   But clearly there's a lot of reasons for the lore.

Thanks for listening,

Colonel Sunday


Just Talking to the Cornfield is baseball talk show that often goes horribly wrong.  Join Earl and the Colonel as they talk about baseball and all things baseball-related. We're mostly on Sunday nights at 9PM EST, but sometimes we prefer to do a post-Happy Hour show on Friday nights because normally we're idiots. But after a few cocktails we're geniuses. Until we listen to the show the next day. Sigh


SundayColonel@aol.com

@JTTTCColonel (Colonel)
@VerdantDude (Earl)

Earl N Colonel (Facebook)


Sundays 9 PM on Talk Shoe:

http://www.talkshoe.com/talkshoe/web/talkCast.jsp?masterId=95365&cmd=tc

























  

Baseball McCarthyism

Some of what I am about to state in this piece is wrong.     Its wrong because there may not be a way to answer a question that has been posed to me recently.    See if you ask questions such as who was best hitter of all time, who had the best outfield arm, or even the age-old question of who was the best centerfielder in NY in the 50s, you may have some statistics to back up your opinion, but in the end its truly your opinion that will provide your answer.   And that's perfectly acceptable, because one of the most beautiful things about baseball is the ability to argue over questions that really don't have an answer.  

Fortunately, and unfortunately, we have statistics in which to compare players performance.   Yet as the old saying goes, there are 3 kinds of lies: Lies, damn lies, and statistics.    But statistics can present how Todd Helton is Lou Gehrig at home (.350 / .447 / .613) but Richie Sexson on the road (.289 / .389 / .475).   Okay, maybe that's a little harsh.  Maybe he's Derrek Lee on the road.

The question that's been asked of me may be a bit harder to answer, because the statistics are perhaps less 'direct'.   Yet in the end I think you will agree with me.  It all started with a basic thought from one of our listeners on "Just Talking To The Cornfield" about the performance of Torre vs. Girardi, which then morphed into a question of whether or not managers make that much of a difference in a teams season performance.    That then led to a question of who was the best manager in baseball, and how can that be answered??    And I'm telling you right now whatever answer I give can't be 100% correct in all peoples minds, so this is just for fun.  Besides, even if I did answer the question many of you will be able to throw out data showing that I am wrong, or that I was right.   Point is, until Randy Johnson faces Ty Cobb, or Al Lopez gets to manage the Big Red Machine, or Ted Williams gets to play in his 'home-town' Petco Park, we will never be able to answer these questions.   But its sure fun as hell to argue over them.

As you see, I have called this piece "Baseball McCarthyism".    Since McCarthyism is generally defined as the act of making unsubstantiated accusations within a political arena, I thought it was not only a perfect title, but also topical.   Plus Joe McCarthy is often thought of as one of the games best managers, with the highest winning percentage in history (.615) and the most World Series Titles (7, tied with Stengel).    Yet Joe got to manage Rogers Hornsby, Hack Wilson, Babe Ruth, Lou Gehrig, Joe Dimaggio and Ted Williams at one time or another, so perhaps there was a little "Phil Jackson" to his success.  Was McCarthy a great manager, or was his success only a result of his team talent.  If it was both, how much was Joe's influence??    Joe Torre was never thought of as a great manager before he joined the Yankees.   Earl, my co-host and the founder of Just Talking to the Cornfield, is a huge Yankee fan and he reminded me of this headline upon Torre's hiring.

It was a bum rap from the New York media who vividly remembered Joe Torre's tenure as a young player-manager with the Mets in the mid-70s to early 80s.   The year before Torre took over as manager, the Mets big three arms (Koosman, Matlack, Seaver) were all having great seasons, and the team had an ERA under 3.   The following season Joe Frazier was fired, Kingman and Seaver were traded and a rebuilding process began.   In addition, Matlack and Koosman regressed quite a bit, going from a collective 38-20 with a 2.82 ERA in 1976 to 15-35 and a 3.81 ERA in 1977.    Team ERA went up a full run, and their already limited offense couldn't nearly make up the difference.   The talent changed, yet Torre was labeled as a bad manager in the country's largest market.  

What the New York media didn't recall, or didn't care to bring up, was that Torre actually had done a fine job with the Atlanta Braves taking over for the fired Bobby Cox  (yes that Bobby Cox).   With basically the same team, Torre took the team from two straight seasons of roughly .500 ball, to starting off in his first year as managing the team to 13 straight wins and an eventual playoff birth.   He won 89 games in his first year, then 88 the second and 80 in the third.   After he left the Braves to join the Angels TV booth in 1985, the Braves rattled off 6 seasons of 66, 72, 69, 54, 63 and 65 wins.   So was Torre the difference maker??   Hard to say that he didn't have an impact since between 1975-1990 the Braves average 66 wins as a team (not including the '81 strike season) yet they averaged 86 wins during Torre's tenure.   

Torre's next stop as manager was the St. Louis Cardinals, who between 1988 and 1990 under Whitey Herzog average 77 wins.   In his first 3 seasons as manager Torre's Cardinals averaged 85 wins, including the 84-win 1991 season in which Todd Zeile led the team with 11 home runs.   Crazy.    But in 1994 the limited product GM Dal Maxvill put on the field finally caught up to them, as starters Bob Tewksbury (5.32 ERA), Allen Watson (5.52), Omar Oliveros (5.74) and closer Mike Perez (8.71) opened the floodgates far too often, and the Cardinals plummeted to last place.

Eventually Dal Maxvill resigned, Joe Torre was fired, Walt Jocketty was hired as GM, and he brought in Tony LaRussa, plucked Todd Stottlemyre and Dennis Eckersley from the A's, signed free agents Ron Gant, Gary Gaetti and Andy Benes and the Cardinals won their division and came within one game of the World Series.    Its a Christmas Miracle right??    Wrong.   Joe Torre was a bad manager, right??   Wrong.

And that's really the point of all this.    Until LaRussa is able to manage the same 94-95 team as Torre did, and until Torre gets to manage the 96 team that LaRussa did, you can't say who is the better manager.   Or at least I can't.

But check this out.   The last 4 teams vying for the World Series in 1996 were the Orioles, Yankees, Cardinals and Braves.    So....

1981 - Davey Johnson is hired as manager of AA Mets farm team
1981 - Joe Torre is fired as Mets manager and Bobby Cox is fired as Braves manager
1982 - Joe Torre replaces Bobby Cox as Braves manager
1984 - Davey Johnson becomes Mets manager, 2 years after Torre was fired
1995 - Joe Torre fired as Cardinals manager, replaced with Tony LaRussa
1996 - Joe Torre hired by Yankees

1996 - Orioles, managed by Davey Johnson lose ALCS to Yankees, managed by Torre.
The Braves, managed once again by Bobby Cox win NLCS over a Tony LaRussa managed Cardinals team.

4 Teams, led by 4 men who would go on to win 8,826 regular season games, 18 pennants and 9 World Series.   

But..... who was the best manager??!!

I thought about this for some time, and the best way that I thought to answer this question was to perform the following:

a) I created a table of all managers wins and losses, by team, from 1970-2012.   The reason I started with the 70s was that I felt that the "free-agent" era was more challenging to manage in, due to the transient nature that exists with players.

b) I added the record of a managers first two-years with a team and compared the winning percentage to the teams prior two seasons.   The reason I did that is because I wanted to compare a teams performance under a manager with as close to a similar roster than the prior manager had.   Of course there are 'outliers' to this process, such as Leyland's 1998 post-sell off Marlins, versus his World Championship 1997 club.   Bobby Cox also benefited in his second tenure as Braves manager in 1991 as he stepped out of the Braves  GM office to manage a team that had Avery, Glavine and Smoltz, coming into their prime.   Yet Russ Nixon managed the team in 89 and 90 with Glavine and Smoltz and they finished at or near the cellar each year.

c) Managers had to manage at least 2 teams to be able to show how they performed compared to their predecessor, and they had to manage at least 2 seasons for each team.

d) I compiled the number of instances in which teams improved under each manager as they joined the team.

e) The came the hard part.    I compiled the results and then looked at the managers whose teams improved greatly and looked to eliminate teams that gained specifically due to large free-agent acquisitions such as the example with LaRussa's 1996 Cardinals.   This is very subjective in nature of course, but reasonably speaking, its fair to see how the team LaRussa managed had much deeper talent than the Torre team the year before.    There were also other instances such as Bobby Cox managing the Braves team as Glavine and Smoltz were coming into their own, which was very similar to when Cox took over the Blue Jays in 1982 when Steib and Clancy elevated their game.

After completing this process, I was able to sort the data using all of the criteria, and thus..... the winners are:

Third Place:    Buck Showalter, 3 teams avg increase in winning %, 0.086 or 14 games per team.

 Buck got his start managing the Yankees before the big boys showed up, yet he still took them from a sub .500 team to a playoff-caliber team within his first 2 seasons.    The staff and lineup when he joined the team was basically the same, not withstanding the acquisition of Jimmy Key.   Most of the Yankee dynasty that you are used to seeing began under Torre's tenure, yet it was Buck Showalter who took over from Stump Merrill and put the team back into the playoffs and on a path of success that they are still riding.   Buck's serious and skilled nature is a strange dichotomy from his peculiar demeanor, noting that his nickname "Buck" reportedly came from his constantly walking around the minor league locker room completely nude.   Makes me hope "Stump" Merrill didn't get his nickname the same way.

In his 3rd year Buck led the Yankees to a tremendous (strike-shortened) 70-43 season, yet note that as mentioned only the first 2 years of a teams performance under the new manager were considered.   Thus, when Buck went to manage Arizona, and they achieved a record of 100-62 in his second year, that 'stop' in his managing career was not considered due to the very many acquisitions that were done by Arizona before that season.  However, in Buck's 3rd stop as manager, he took over a Texas team that had a ton of hitting and not much pitching.  In the 3 years before he took over as Manager the Rangers won 71, 73 and 72 games.    In his first year the team won 71 games, but that rose to 89 in his second season.  A dramatic turnaround for a team that didn't learn about the importance of pitching until Ron Washington's tenure.

And now Buck is managing the Orioles, a team that hasn't had a winning record since 1998.   A team that has finished in last place in each of the last 4 seasons.    With 3 starters having with ERA's above 5, and a lineup very similar to teams in recent memory, he has the Orioles in 2nd place with 74 wins in 133 games, noting that the team hasn't had more than 70 wins in 162 games since 2005.   Its not a coincidence.   Its George Constanza's porn hero, Buck Naked.


Second Place:   Davey Johnson 5 teams avg increase in winning %, 0.079 or 13 games per team.

As you can see, I've chosen Davey Johnson over Buck due to his ability to increase performance on 5 teams, even though his percentage is slightly less (1 win).  I'm not sure what to categorize Davey Johnson as.    He's not considered to be a fiery manager, he's also not considered to be a 'players-manager' like say, Joe Maddon.    The guy just keeps winning.   Perhaps its a combination of his cool Texas attitude and the skills he learned while obtaining a Bachelors degree in mathematics that give him the advantage in the dugout.    Some may be able to say that his numbers are skewed by the development of the Mets in the early 80's, (Gooden, Fernandez, Strawberry), except remember that he managed these guys in the minors as well and was able to manage that mess of a clubhouse and along the way became the first manager in the history of the National League to win 90 games in his first 5 seasons.

His abilities as a manager became questioned less after he saved a Reds team that began spiral after reaching quick success and a World Series title in 1990.   The year Johnson took over the team from Tony Perez,1993, they finished in 5th place, but Johnson then led them to two straight first place finishes only to be fired by Marge Schott for the crime of living with his fiancee.     The next season Johnson was managing the Orioles who hadn't been in the playoffs since they won the World Series in 1983, and had a revolving door of big name managers since (Ripken, Weaver, Ripken again, Frank Robinson, Johnny Oates, then Phil Regan).    No matter.   In his first year Johnson took the team to the playoffs and a 2nd place finish.   The following season the Orioles finished in first place and made their second trip to the ALCS game.    Yet, owner Peter Angelos and Johnson were never able to get along, and he was fired over a minor infraction.   Brilliant move by Angelos, Orioles haven't made the playoffs since, and while they were 1st in fan attendance in Johnson's last year (1996) they've never recovered (currently they are 8th in AL attendance even with their winnings way.)

Johnson had a short tenure with the Dodgers, taking the team to a second place finish in his 2nd season at the helm, after the team began to become stagnant under the management of Bill Russell and Glenn Hoffman (neither who have managed a Major League game since).    After working with Team USA and in the National front office, he returned to a Mangers post in the middle of the 2011 season.   Once again, some may say that the Nationals success is due to whats on the field.   And of course some of that is true.   But the Nationals have been good before, and they've had great managers before.  So why are they so good now??    This has been the best the Nationals / Expos have been since the strike of 1994 wiped out their playoff hopes.  (Note:   For a very personal insight into the Expos 1994 season you should read the book "Strike Three!!  by Russ Cohen and Nikco Riesgo).  Yes they have a very solid staff, and a nice lineup, yet the Expos, and other teams, in the past have also had a talented group of players, but the success didn't translate on the field.    Once again, the common denominator is the teams manager.   That's not to say that another manager wouldn't have success with this team, yet how much success??   But that's five teams, all who have improved dramatically under Johnson.  American League, National League, all teams with different makeups, all who improved swiftly under his management.


Before we go to the manager who has made the most positive difference, allow me to list out the bottom 5 (once again please note this is only the list of managers who have managed more than 1 team for at least 2 seasons, and the decrease is the net aggregate decrease in winning % in their first 2 years).

5) Hal McRae (-7 wins)
4) Jerry Manuel (-8 wins)
3) Ken Macha (-9 wins)
2) Pat Corrales (-9 wins)
1) Bob Boone (-14 wins)


And the others in the top 10:

10) Dallas Green - 2 Teams, +10 wins
9) Roger Craig - 2 Teams, + 14 wins
8) Whitey Herzog - 2 Teams, + 15 wins
7) Gene Mauch - 3 Teams, + 11 wins
6) Tony LaRussa - 3 Teams, + 11 wins
5) Dick Williams - 4 Teams, + 11 wins
4) Bobby Cox - 2 Teams, but +26 wins


So, that leaves just one man.    And if you haven't guessed..... shame on you.



First Place:   Billy Martin   7 teams avg increase in winning %, 0.101 or 16 games per team.

If you know anything about baseball history, you know about Martin.   His temper, his refusal to follow authority, and his unflappable disdain for those who didn't simply try.   While you'd expect him to have grown up in some rough inner city, many folks don't realize that he was born and raised in Berkeley, California.    And if it wasn't for some good fortune, the world may never have known about Martin.   

The Boston Braves had a manager who couldn't seem to cut it at the Major League level, yet he was a good baseball guy and so they offered him a spot at their minor league Pacific Coast level team, the Milwaukee Brewers.   The owner of the Brewers at the time, Bill Veeck tried to block the hiring, but as he was overseas in military service his objection was not followed.   The manager went on to win the pennant that year.   A few years later the manager was hired by another minor league team, the Oakland Oaks, and he went on to win the PCL championship in his first year.  As the Oaks were formally a Yankee affiliate, he was able to parlay his minor league success into a spot at the Major League level with the Yankees.   Early in his tenure, this man.....Casey Stengel, ensured to bring along Martin, his ultra-aggressive Oaks second baseman to the Yankees.

But instead of pouring over stories about the man, lets return to basics, and look at the numbers:

1968 Twins - 79-83

Billy Martin Hired
1969 Twins - 97-65,1st Place

1970 Tigers - 79-83

Billy Martin hired:
1971 Tigers - 91-71, 2nd Place
1972 Tigers - 86-70, 1st Place

1973 Rangers - 59-103
Billy Martin hired:  (Note he was hired in 73 and finished 9-14)
1974 Rangers - 84-76, 2nd place

1975 Yankees - 83-77
Billy Martin hired: (Note he was hired in 75 and was 30-26)
1976 Yankees - 97-62, 1st Place - Lost WS to Reds
1977 Yankees - 100-62, 1st Place - Won WS vs. Dodgers

1979 Oakland - 54-108
Billy Martin hired:
1980 Oakland - 83-79, 2nd Place

1982 Yankees - 79-83
Billy Martin hired:
1983 Yankees - 91-71, 3rd Place

1984 Yankees - 87-75
Billy Martin hired:
1985 Yankees - 97-64, 2nd place*
Team was 6-10 under Berra, 91-54 under Martin

and finally:
1988 Yankees - 45-48 (.483) under Piniella, 40-28 (.588) under Martin



So as many have asked of late, does the manager make a difference.   And to me the answer is of course they do.   Would the Cardinals have won last year without LaRussa??   Probably not.   Would the Tigers have won in 1984 with Gene Mauch at the helm and not Sparky Anderson??   Well we can't answer that question, but the one question I can answer for certain is that of all the managers I've seen in my lifetime, there is only one Number 1.   And if you don't know who number 1 is, ask Billy.   He made sure to let you know on his '72 Topps Card.

Thanks for listening,

Colonel Sunday


Just Talking to the Cornfield is baseball talk show that often goes horribly wrong.  Join Earl and the Colonel as they talk about baseball and all things baseball-related. We're mostly on Sunday nights at 9PM EST, but sometimes we prefer to do a post-Happy Hour show on Friday nights because normally we're idiots. But after a few cocktails we're geniuses. Until we listen to the show the next day. Sigh


SundayColonel@aol.com

@JTTTCColonel (Colonel)
@VerdantDude (Earl)

Earl N Colonel (Facebook)


Sunday 9 PM on Talk Shoe:

http://www.talkshoe.com/talkshoe/web/talkCast.jsp?masterId=95365&cmd=tc