The Allen Craig Theory

April 22, 2003, just a seemingly average game in April taking place between the league royalty St. Louis Cardinals and the progressively more exciting Washington Nationals.     You wouldn’t normally think there was much rivalry between these two teams.     It would seem no two teams could be more dissimilar.   Much has been told about the Expos downward spiral, trying unsuccessfully to compete for attention of Canadian sports fans, and only rewarding whatever fans they had with one first place finish, albeit in a season in which the playoffs were never actually played.    Ironically, the only time before 2012 that the Expos/Nationals made the playoffs was during another strike-shortened season, 1981.    Meanwhile the Cardinals have had exactly one last place finish since 1920, but have managed to rack up about a dozen titles since then.   Though last year perhaps the seeds of a rivalry were born in the playoff match-up between these two historically antithetic franchises.   

In game four of the League Division Season, with the Cardinals up 2 games to 1, bottom of the ninth,  score tied 1-1, Jayson Werth, the Nationals $126 million dollar man faced Cardinals righty Lance Lynn.    Pitch after pitch was fouled off, until Lynn, perhaps frustrated with facing the same man for 13 pitches threw a fastball trying to induce Werth to make contact and be done with.   Werth  did exactly that.   He made contact, and the at bat was over.   As was the game so it turned out.    The home run to left tied the series, leaving the hometown crowd feeling, if even for a moment, that $126 million may have been money well spent.  

Now, we all love baseball for those dramatic moments, watching a game-winning home run go slowly over the outfield wall.   The dramatic scene in the movie Moneyball where Scott Hatteberg hits the home run off of steroid-rat Jason Grimsley to win the A’s twentieth consecutive game is one of the movies’ great defining moments.   We never know when those events take place, and that’s what makes it so exciting.    But what made that moment even more thrilling, or perhaps more ‘surprising’ is who actually hit the home run.   Now Jayson Werth is a fine ball-player.  Good hitter, good fielder, swift-runner, solid on-base guy.   But Jayson Werth is hardly the definition of a ‘clutch’ hitter.  But we will get back to that.  

Game 5 of that playoff series between the Nationals and the Cardinals was one of the most thrilling playoff games in recent memory.   Bryce Harper, the 19-year old uber UBER phenom tripled home Jayson Werth off of Adam Wainright in the first inning, then homered off the perennial Cy Young candidate in the third inning.   Eventually, the Nationals took a 6-0 lead, which in most times would have been more than enough.    The Cardinals clawed back, pulling to within one run, then found themselves back down two, with the score being 7-5 going into the ninth off of Nationals closer Drew Storen.    Storen, a Stanford-graduate was bred to be a closer.   A high-school pitching star, he spent his entire college and minor league career as a closer, specifically for these exact moments.   And you know when you’re a kid and you are pretending to be in these dramatic situations, you find yourself “announcing” the pretend game that you are playing.   Well, that probably didn’t happen too often in the Storen house since his father Mark Patrick probably did that for him (as Mark Patrick of MLB Network Radio was actually born Mark Storen).    Plus adding to the dramatic moment was that Drew Storen’s high school teammate was in the stadium.  None other than Lance Lynn, the guy who gave up the home run to Jayson Werth in game 4.   Buddy, you can’t make this stuff up.

In the bottom of the ninth of game 5, with Storen on the mound, the Cardinals rallied for 4 runs, including a couple of dramatic clutch hits by infielders Daniel Descalso and Peter Kozma, two formerly unheralded players from the Cardinals 2007 MLB draft.   During that 9th inning, Cardinals first basemen Allen Craig struck out with one man out and Carlos Beltran on third.     Perhaps the strikeout was not as noteworthy as the homerun by the Nationals Werth in the prior game, but perhaps it could be considered just as surprising.    See, unlike Werth, Allen Craig is most assuredly considered to be a ‘clutch hitter’.

For sake of this piece, let’s consider a clutch hitter to be one who performs in situations with runners in scoring position, as well as situations in which there are two outs with runners in scoring position (RISP, 2 Out).   Yet if you were to do research on the existence of clutch hitting, you might find that some of the brightest minds of baseball research will say that it doesn’t exist.    And they may be right.     The writers say that for a person to be a truly clutch hitter that they would need to consistently perform in those situation year over year.    There is some merit to the need of seeing consistency before you call someone a ‘clutch’ hitter.    Very rarely do you see a ‘strikeout pitcher’ who gets 200k’s one year, and 110 the next.  They are called strikeouts pitchers for a reason.   Power hitters, same thing.     Yet if there were players who did perform year-in and year-out in ‘clutch’ situations would that debunk the theory that clutch hitting was a myth??    Maybe exceptions aren’t enough to do that, but anytime statistical analysis exposes a predictable trend it does make watching the game a bit more intriguing.  

A question that keeps popping up in my mind is one I need help trying to answer.   Is every hit valued equally??    Imagine a guy who hits .500 whenever his team is up or down 4 runs or more, or a player who hits .400 when no one is on base, but .100 when runners are on base.   Each of these hitters can end up with a .330 batting average, but should they be considered productive hitters??    Yes, these are unrealistic scenarios, but it’s just as unrealistic to assume players can hit for the same general batting average in every situation.     (However there are exceptions to even that, such as Tony Gwynn who was an exceptional hitter regardless of the game situation.)

Allen Craig is one of those rare players, who thus far in his 4 year career has shown to be a consistent producer in such ‘clutch’ situations.    Let’s examine:

 

2010 Batting Average     .241

2010 BA RISP                      .258

2010 BA RISP, 2 Out         .250

 

2011 Batting Average     .315

2011 BA RISP                      .316

2011 BA RISP, 2 Out         .333

 

2012 Batting Average     .307

2012 BA RISP                      .400

2012 BA RISP, 2 Out         .313

 

 

On the surface, it looks like a minor differential between Craig’s batting average and his average in clutch situations.    In fact, let’s be realistic; it is a minor differential.   Also, note that Allen Craig was not a true regular until 2012.   His at bat totals for 2010 through 2012 were 114, 200, and 469.  However note the following.    Of all players who had 75 or more at bats each year between 2010 and 2012, only 19 players had batting averages with RISP and 2 outs higher than their overall batting average in each of those 3 years.    Allen Craig is one of those 19, but he’s also the only one to have an overall batting average of .300 in the group.  

 

The player with the greatest differential  between their overall average and their ‘BA RISP, 2 Out’ is, yep, you guessed it…. Paul Janish.   Paul freakin’ Janish. 

 

2010 Batting Average     .260

2010 BA RISP                      .386

2010 BA RISP, 2 Out         .318

 

2011 Batting Average     .214

2011 BA RISP                      .217

2011 BA RISP, 2 Out         .333

 

2012 Batting Average     .186

2012 BA RISP                      .231

2012 BA RISP, 2 Out         .286

 

What makes Paul Janish’s batting average go up almost 100 per year during those tense at bats I’m sure I don’t know.   And if you ask Bill James he will say it’s a myth, a small-sample size, an anomaly, or something other than a reliable statistical event.    But now let’s go back and review the hero of game 4 of the 2012 National League Divisional Series, Mr. Jayson Werth.

 

2010 Batting Average     .296

2010 BA RISP                      .186

2010 BA RISP, 2 Out         .139

 

2011 Batting Average     .232

2011 BA RISP                      .229

2011 BA RISP, 2 Out         .179

 

2012 Batting Average     .300

2012 BA RISP                      .250

2012 BA RISP, 2 Out         .176

 

 

Look at those declines!!   A 50 point average decline with RISP and a 110 point decrease in RISP, 2 out.   Statistical anomaly my ass.   Anyone who thinks this is a not a reliable statistical trend can, as they would say in Montreal…  embrassez mes boules.    Many people were shocked when the Nationals offered Jayson Werth such a massive contract.    Yes, he’s a fine ballplayer, but for $126M I imagine a team would expect a player to perform better in those situations.   The ole expression of ‘he never comes through in the clutch’ is often based upon the fan’s experience in watching a team over the course of a season, or seasons.   But yet a simple statistical review can show what the intelligent fan already has witnessed.   Yes it was great to see Werth hit that home run in game 4, but recall that there were no outs, and no one on base.    Over the last 3 year, Jayson Werth is a .293 hitter with no one on base.  He just also happens to be a .240 hitter with men on base, .215 with runners in scoring position, and a miserable .160 with two outs and RISP.

 

 

On the other side of the spectrum, Ryan Zimmerman is the most consistent differential producer in such situations:

 

2010 Batting Average     .307

2010 BA RISP                      .313

2010 BA RISP, 2 Out         .365

 

2011 Batting Average     .289

2011 BA RISP                      .293

2011 BA RISP, 2 Out         .368

 

2012 Batting Average     .282

2012 BA RISP                      .266

2012 BA RISP, 2 Out         .327

 

This shows that Zimmerman batting average each year goes up about 50 points in two-out situations with Runners in Scoring Position.   Now I realize that the spread would be bigger if I was to back out plate-appearances with no runners on base, but I’m trying to keep this analysis light and moderate.

 

I understand that many brighter minds than mine have done a greater level of research to prove the reliability of such trends, but I’m simply not convinced.  I watch enough baseball to realize it IS a game in which emotions can greatly affect performance.    Look at the following two comparisons:

Alex Rios

2010 Batting Average     .284

2010 BA RISP                      .306

2010 BA RISP, 2 Out         .379

 

2011 Batting Average     .227

2011 BA RISP                      .171

2011 BA RISP, 2 Out         .075

 

2012 Batting Average     .304

2012 BA RISP                      .348

2012 BA RISP, 2 Out         .233

 

Torii Hunter

2010 Batting Average     .281

2010 BA RISP                      .297

2010 BA RISP, 2 Out         .323

 

2011 Batting Average     .262

2011 BA RISP                      .279

2011 BA RISP, 2 Out         .231

 

2012 Batting Average     .313

2012 BA RISP                      .344

2012 BA RISP, 2 Out         .426

 

 

Oh we could have a field day with this.   In 2011 the White Sox were a mess.   Adam Dunn joined the team and couldn’t hit Tim Collins’ weight.   Ozzie Guillen lost control, and his “managerial magic” finally ran out.   I question that he ever had it.   An entertaining chap, but he clearly unraveled, and has continued to do so.   Alex Rios had no ability to pick up the slack, and his already lackadaisical approach slid deeper and deeper until had had zero motivation to get anything out of his God-given talent.    He was 4 for 53 with RISP, 2 Outs.    The man was making $12,500,000 in 2011, and in 53 plate appearances with two outs and RISP managed 3 singles and one double.   That’s it.    In 2012, under new White Sox manager Robin Ventura, Rios had a nice bounce back year, but still under-performed in those situations. 

 

Torii Hunter on the other hand truly elevated his game in 2012.   It didn’t hurt that Hunter was hitting behind Trout and ahead of Pujols.    But at 36, Hunter was playing for a new contract, and he did pick a heck of a time to hit .300 for the first time in his 15-year career.     Hunter historically in his career hit a home run every 25 at-bats, and 61% of his hits were singles.  Last year he hit a homer ever 33 at bats, and 75% of his hits were singles.   Plus as you see his performance in the clutch sky-rocketed.   All in all, a very solid and perhaps ‘smart’ change to his hitting approach landed the 37 year old a brand new $26 million dollar contract with the Tigers.

But now let us return to how the article started.    The day before the April 22^nd game between the Cardinals and Nationals, it’s Sunday April 21^st my buddy Earl and I were having a discussion on our weekly podcast “Just Talking to the Cornfield”, and as is usually the case, were are in the midst of a debate in which he eventually wins.   I am discussing what I call “The Allen Craig Theory” of how players can perform in higher-pressure situations.   I have prepared for the discussion by compiling some statistical evidence, including the fact that since 1960 the player with the highest career batting average with RISP is Mr. Craig, (see the top 10 below):

 

Highest Career Avg (RISP, minimum 200 AB’s with RISP)

Player                                   Career Avg                          Career RISP                        Differential

Allen Craig                           .296                                        .357                                        +.061

Joey Votto                          .315                                        .351                                        +.036

Tony Gwynn                      .338                                        .349                                        +.011

Joe Mauer                          .322                                        .343                                        +.021

Rod Carew                          .328                                        .339                                        +.011

Roberto Clemente          .317                                        .337                                        +.020

Albert Pujols                      .324                                        .336                                        +.012

So Taguchi                           .279                                        .331                                        +.052

Miguel Cabrera                 .319                                        .329                                        +.010

Adrian Gonzalez               .295                                        .329                                        +.034

 

 

Sure enough, 7^th inning, with one out and runners on 1^st and 3^rd, Allen Craig lines a single to LF off of Phili reliever Chad Durbin to give the Cardinals a 3-2 lead.    Buster Olney tweets:

 

Buster Olney‏@Buster_ESPN21 Apr  And the Cardinals with another hit in RISP... More damage from Allen Craig...

And yes I’m feeling good about my theory.   Now let’s move onto that April 22^nd game between the Cardinals and Nationals.  There is no score in the 3^rd inning, but the Cardinals have men on 1^st and 2^nd two outs.  Allen Craig comes through, hitting a double to left field, two runs in.    Later in the game, 8^th inning, the speedy Nationals outfielder Denard Span has led off with a single.   It’s a 3-2 game, and Werth simply has to get that runner to 2^nd base.  If he can’t knock him in, he has to at least get him into scoring position.   Yet, he strikes out leaving the runner at 1^st.   Cardinals win 3-2

 

Next game, 0-0 in the fourth inning, Shane Robinson of the Cardinals leads off with a single, Allen Craig doubles him home and the Cardinals take the lead.  In the sixth inning, Washington has men on 1^st and 3^rd, one out, Jayson Werth comes up.  The score is now 2-0 Cardinals.  Jayson Werth sees one pitch, and pops it up to second base.    No grounder to score the runner, no sac fly, no walk, just a one-pitch pop up, runners are stranded.  Eighth inning, same game, score is still 2-0 Cardinals, and once again Denard Span is on base, this time he’s at 2^nd after a wild pitch.  Jayson Werth hits a soft ground ball to shortstop, Cardinals win 2-0.

 

April 24^th, third game of the series, Cardinals jump to a quick 3-0 lead against Strasburg, but in the 6^th the Nationals have a rally.   Strasburg, the pitcher trying to help his cause leads off with a single.  Denard Span follows that with another single.   Jayson Werth is up, with no outs and 2 men on base.    He promptly hits a ground ball to the Cardinals pitcher, who goes to first to retire Werth.    Cardinals win 4-2.   Yes later that game Werth hits a stat-padding solo shot to make it a 4-2 game.   But in pressure situations, with runners on front of him, he has failed to deliver, as is often the case.

 

Statistical anomaly, unpredictable trend.  Say what you will.  In 2013, Jayson Werth is hitting .275, but only .240 with RISP and .091 (1-11) with RISP, 2 Outs.   Allen Craig by comparison is hitting .262, sure it’s a lower overall average when compared to Werth.  But Allen Craig is also hitting .440 with RISP, and a ridiculous .636 (7-11) with RISP, 2 Outs.     Jayson Werth is making $16 million this year, Allen Craig, $1.75 million.    This would be a great time to mock the name “werth” as in who is “werth” their money.   But nah.    Let’s keep it straight.   Fact is, Allen Craig has probably been playing fearlessly since he was a kid.   He hit a home run in his first college at bat, and for those two don’t remember, he came off the bench as a pinch-hitter in games 1 and 2 of the 2011 World Series, and delivered singles in the ole RISP, 2 Out situation becoming the only player with 2 go-ahead RBI’s as a pinch hitter in the history of the World Series.   And these were his first two at-bats in World Series play.    So I ask you again.  Is this an unpredictable trend, or perhaps is there something to “The Allen Craig Theory”.    They say time always tells, but time has already told us.