April 22, 2003, just a seemingly
average game in April taking place between the league royalty St. Louis
Cardinals and the progressively more exciting Washington Nationals. You wouldn’t normally think there was much
rivalry between these two teams. It
would seem no two teams could be more dissimilar. Much has been told about the Expos downward
spiral, trying unsuccessfully to compete for attention of Canadian sports fans,
and only rewarding whatever fans they had with one first place finish, albeit
in a season in which the playoffs were never actually played. Ironically, the only time before 2012 that
the Expos/Nationals made the playoffs was during another strike-shortened
season, 1981. Meanwhile the Cardinals
have had exactly one last place finish since 1920, but have managed to rack up
about a dozen titles since then. Though
last year perhaps the seeds of a rivalry were born in the playoff match-up
between these two historically antithetic franchises.
In game four of the League Division
Season, with the Cardinals up 2 games to 1, bottom of the ninth, score tied 1-1, Jayson Werth, the Nationals
$126 million dollar man faced Cardinals righty Lance Lynn. Pitch after pitch was fouled off, until
Lynn, perhaps frustrated with facing the same man for 13 pitches threw a
fastball trying to induce Werth to make contact and be done with. Werth
did exactly that. He made
contact, and the at bat was over. As
was the game so it turned out. The
home run to left tied the series, leaving the hometown crowd feeling, if even
for a moment, that $126 million may have been money well spent.
Now, we all love baseball for
those dramatic moments, watching a game-winning home run go slowly over the
outfield wall. The dramatic scene in
the movie Moneyball where Scott Hatteberg hits the home run off of steroid-rat
Jason Grimsley to win the A’s twentieth consecutive game is one of the movies’
great defining moments. We never know
when those events take place, and that’s what makes it so exciting. But what made that moment even more
thrilling, or perhaps more ‘surprising’ is who actually hit the home run. Now Jayson Werth is a fine ball-player. Good hitter, good fielder, swift-runner,
solid on-base guy. But Jayson Werth is
hardly the definition of a ‘clutch’ hitter.
But we will get back to that.
Game 5 of that playoff series
between the Nationals and the Cardinals was one of the most thrilling playoff
games in recent memory. Bryce Harper,
the 19-year old uber UBER phenom tripled home Jayson Werth off of Adam
Wainright in the first inning, then homered off the perennial Cy Young
candidate in the third inning.
Eventually, the Nationals took a 6-0 lead, which in most times would
have been more than enough. The
Cardinals clawed back, pulling to within one run, then found themselves back
down two, with the score being 7-5 going into the ninth off of Nationals closer
Drew Storen. Storen, a
Stanford-graduate was bred to be a closer.
A high-school pitching star, he spent his entire college and minor
league career as a closer, specifically for these exact moments. And you know when you’re a kid and you are
pretending to be in these dramatic situations, you find yourself “announcing”
the pretend game that you are playing.
Well, that probably didn’t happen too often in the Storen house since
his father Mark Patrick probably did that for him (as Mark Patrick of MLB
Network Radio was actually born Mark Storen).
Plus adding to the dramatic moment was that Drew Storen’s high school
teammate was in the stadium. None other
than Lance Lynn, the guy who gave up the home run to Jayson Werth in game
4. Buddy, you can’t make this stuff up.
In the bottom of the ninth of
game 5, with Storen on the mound, the Cardinals rallied for 4 runs, including a
couple of dramatic clutch hits by infielders Daniel Descalso and Peter Kozma,
two formerly unheralded players from the Cardinals 2007 MLB draft. During that 9th inning, Cardinals first
basemen Allen Craig struck out with one man out and Carlos Beltran on
third. Perhaps
the strikeout was not as noteworthy as the homerun by the Nationals Werth in
the prior game, but perhaps it could be considered just as surprising. See, unlike Werth, Allen Craig is most
assuredly considered to be a ‘clutch hitter’.
For sake of this piece, let’s
consider a clutch hitter to be one who performs in situations with runners in
scoring position, as well as situations in which there are two outs with
runners in scoring position (RISP, 2 Out).
Yet if you were to do research on the existence of clutch hitting, you might
find that some of the brightest minds of baseball research will say that it
doesn’t exist. And they may be
right. The writers say that for a
person to be a truly clutch hitter that they would need to consistently perform
in those situation year over year.
There is some merit to the need of seeing consistency before you call
someone a ‘clutch’ hitter. Very rarely
do you see a ‘strikeout pitcher’ who gets 200k’s one year, and 110 the
next. They are called strikeouts
pitchers for a reason. Power hitters,
same thing. Yet if there were players who did perform
year-in and year-out in ‘clutch’ situations would that debunk the theory that
clutch hitting was a myth?? Maybe
exceptions aren’t enough to do that, but anytime statistical analysis exposes a
predictable trend it does make watching the game a bit more intriguing.
A question that keeps popping up
in my mind is one I need help trying to answer. Is every hit valued equally?? Imagine a guy who hits .500 whenever his
team is up or down 4 runs or more, or a player who hits .400 when no one is on
base, but .100 when runners are on base.
Each of these hitters can end up with a .330 batting average, but should
they be considered productive hitters??
Yes, these are unrealistic scenarios, but it’s just as unrealistic to
assume players can hit for the same general batting average in every
situation. (However there are
exceptions to even that, such as Tony Gwynn who was an exceptional hitter regardless
of the game situation.)
Allen Craig is one of those rare
players, who thus far in his 4 year career has shown to be a consistent producer
in such ‘clutch’ situations. Let’s examine:
2010 Batting Average .241
2010 BA RISP .258
2010 BA RISP, 2 Out .250
2011 Batting Average .315
2011 BA RISP .316
2011 BA RISP, 2 Out .333
2012 Batting Average .307
2012 BA RISP .400
2012 BA RISP, 2 Out .313
On the surface, it looks like a
minor differential between Craig’s batting average and his average in clutch
situations. In fact, let’s be realistic;
it is a minor differential. Also, note
that Allen Craig was not a true regular until 2012. His at bat totals for 2010 through 2012 were
114, 200, and 469. However note the
following. Of all players who had 75
or more at bats each year between 2010 and 2012, only 19 players had batting
averages with RISP and 2 outs higher than their overall batting average in each
of those 3 years. Allen Craig is one of those 19, but he’s also the
only one to have an overall batting average of .300 in the group.
The player with the greatest
differential between their overall
average and their ‘BA RISP, 2 Out’ is, yep, you guessed it…. Paul Janish. Paul freakin’ Janish.
2010 Batting Average .260
2010 BA RISP .386
2010 BA RISP, 2 Out .318
2011 Batting Average .214
2011 BA RISP .217
2011 BA RISP, 2 Out .333
2012 Batting Average .186
2012 BA RISP .231
2012 BA RISP, 2 Out .286
What makes Paul Janish’s batting
average go up almost 100 per year during those tense at bats I’m sure I don’t
know. And if you ask Bill James he will
say it’s a myth, a small-sample size, an anomaly, or something other than a reliable
statistical event. But now let’s go back and review the hero of
game 4 of the 2012 National League Divisional Series, Mr. Jayson Werth.
2010 Batting Average .296
2010 BA RISP .186
2010 BA RISP, 2 Out .139
2011 Batting Average .232
2011 BA RISP .229
2011 BA RISP, 2 Out .179
2012 Batting Average .300
2012 BA RISP .250
2012 BA RISP, 2 Out .176
Look at those declines!! A 50
point average decline with RISP and a 110 point decrease in RISP, 2 out. Statistical anomaly my ass. Anyone who thinks this is a not a reliable statistical
trend can, as they would say in Montreal…
embrassez mes boules. Many
people were shocked when the Nationals offered Jayson Werth such a massive
contract. Yes, he’s a fine ballplayer,
but for $126M I imagine a team would expect a player to perform better in those
situations. The ole expression of ‘he
never comes through in the clutch’ is often based upon the fan’s experience in
watching a team over the course of a season, or seasons. But yet a simple statistical review can show
what the intelligent fan already has witnessed. Yes it was great to see Werth hit that home
run in game 4, but recall that there were no outs, and no one on base. Over
the last 3 year, Jayson Werth is a .293 hitter with no one on base. He just also happens to be a .240 hitter with
men on base, .215 with runners in scoring position, and a miserable .160 with
two outs and RISP.
On the other side of the spectrum, Ryan Zimmerman is the most
consistent differential producer in such situations:
2010 Batting Average .307
2010 BA RISP .313
2010 BA RISP, 2 Out .365
2011 Batting Average .289
2011 BA RISP .293
2011 BA RISP, 2 Out .368
2012 Batting Average .282
2012 BA RISP .266
2012 BA RISP, 2 Out .327
This shows that Zimmerman batting
average each year goes up about 50 points in two-out situations with Runners in
Scoring Position. Now I realize that
the spread would be bigger if I was to back out plate-appearances with no runners
on base, but I’m trying to keep this analysis light and moderate.
I understand that many brighter
minds than mine have done a greater level of research to prove the reliability
of such trends, but I’m simply not convinced.
I watch enough baseball to realize it IS a game in which emotions can
greatly affect performance. Look at the following two comparisons:
Alex Rios
2010 Batting Average .284
2010 BA RISP .306
2010 BA RISP, 2 Out .379
2011 Batting Average .227
2011 BA RISP .171
2011 BA RISP, 2 Out .075
2012 Batting Average .304
2012 BA RISP .348
2012 BA RISP, 2 Out .233
Torii Hunter
2010 Batting Average .281
2010 BA RISP .297
2010 BA RISP, 2 Out .323
2011 Batting Average .262
2011 BA RISP .279
2011 BA RISP, 2 Out .231
2012 Batting Average .313
2012 BA RISP .344
2012 BA RISP, 2 Out .426
Oh we could have a field day with
this. In 2011 the White Sox were a
mess. Adam Dunn joined the team and
couldn’t hit Tim Collins’ weight. Ozzie
Guillen lost control, and his “managerial magic” finally ran out. I question that he ever had it. An entertaining chap, but he clearly
unraveled, and has continued to do so.
Alex Rios had no ability to pick up the slack, and his already lackadaisical
approach slid deeper and deeper until had had zero motivation to get anything
out of his God-given talent. He was 4
for 53 with RISP, 2 Outs. The man was making $12,500,000 in 2011, and in
53 plate appearances with two outs and RISP managed 3 singles and one
double. That’s it. In
2012, under new White Sox manager Robin Ventura, Rios had a nice bounce back
year, but still under-performed in those situations.
Torii Hunter on the other hand
truly elevated his game in 2012. It
didn’t hurt that Hunter was hitting behind Trout and ahead of Pujols. But at 36, Hunter was playing for a new
contract, and he did pick a heck of a time to hit .300 for the first time in
his 15-year career. Hunter historically in his career hit a home
run every 25 at-bats, and 61% of his hits were singles. Last year he hit a homer ever 33 at bats, and
75% of his hits were singles. Plus as
you see his performance in the clutch sky-rocketed. All in all, a very solid and perhaps ‘smart’
change to his hitting approach landed the 37 year old a brand new $26 million
dollar contract with the Tigers.
But now let us return to how the
article started. The day before the April
22nd game between the Cardinals and Nationals, it’s Sunday April 21st
my buddy Earl and I were having a discussion on our weekly podcast “Just
Talking to the Cornfield”, and as is usually the case, were are in the midst of
a debate in which he eventually wins. I
am discussing what I call “The Allen Craig Theory” of how players can perform
in higher-pressure situations. I have prepared
for the discussion by compiling some statistical evidence, including the fact
that since 1960 the player with the highest career batting average with RISP is
Mr. Craig, (see the top 10 below):
Highest Career Avg (RISP, minimum
200 AB’s with RISP)
Player Career Avg Career
RISP Differential
Allen Craig .296 .357 +.061
Joey Votto .315 .351 +.036
Tony Gwynn .338 .349 +.011
Joe Mauer .322 .343 +.021
Rod Carew .328 .339 +.011
Roberto Clemente .317 .337 +.020
Albert Pujols .324 .336 +.012
So Taguchi .279 .331 +.052
Miguel Cabrera .319 .329 +.010
Adrian Gonzalez .295 .329 +.034
Sure enough, 7th inning, with one out and runners on 1st
and 3rd, Allen Craig lines a single to LF off of Phili reliever Chad
Durbin to give the Cardinals a 3-2 lead.
Buster Olney tweets:
Buster Olney@Buster_ESPN And the
Cardinals with another hit in RISP... More damage from Allen Craig...
And yes I’m feeling good about my theory. Now let’s move onto that April 22nd
game between the Cardinals and Nationals.
There is no score in the 3rd inning, but the Cardinals have men
on 1st and 2nd two outs. Allen Craig comes through, hitting a double to
left field, two runs in. Later in the game, 8th inning, the
speedy Nationals outfielder Denard Span has led off with a single. It’s a 3-2 game, and Werth simply has to get
that runner to 2nd base. If
he can’t knock him in, he has to at least get him into scoring position. Yet, he strikes out leaving the runner at 1st. Cardinals win 3-2
Next game, 0-0 in the fourth inning, Shane Robinson of the Cardinals leads
off with a single, Allen Craig doubles him home and the Cardinals take the
lead. In the sixth inning, Washington
has men on 1st and 3rd, one out, Jayson Werth comes
up. The score is now 2-0 Cardinals. Jayson Werth sees one pitch, and pops it up
to second base. No grounder to score
the runner, no sac fly, no walk, just a one-pitch pop up, runners are
stranded. Eighth inning, same game,
score is still 2-0 Cardinals, and once again Denard Span is on base, this time he’s
at 2nd after a wild pitch.
Jayson Werth hits a soft ground ball to shortstop, Cardinals win 2-0.
April 24th, third game of the series, Cardinals jump to a
quick 3-0 lead against Strasburg, but in the 6th the Nationals have
a rally. Strasburg, the pitcher trying to
help his cause leads off with a single.
Denard Span follows that with another single. Jayson Werth is up, with no outs and 2 men
on base. He promptly hits a ground ball to the
Cardinals pitcher, who goes to first to retire Werth. Cardinals win 4-2. Yes later that game Werth hits a
stat-padding solo shot to make it a 4-2 game.
But in pressure situations, with runners on front of him, he has failed
to deliver, as is often the case.
Statistical anomaly, unpredictable trend. Say what you will. In 2013, Jayson Werth is hitting .275, but only
.240 with RISP and .091 (1-11) with RISP, 2 Outs. Allen Craig by comparison is hitting .262, sure
it’s a lower overall average when compared to Werth. But Allen Craig is also hitting .440 with
RISP, and a ridiculous .636 (7-11) with RISP, 2 Outs. Jayson Werth is making $16 million this
year, Allen Craig, $1.75 million. This would be a great time to mock the name “werth”
as in who is “werth” their money. But
nah. Let’s keep it straight. Fact is, Allen Craig has probably been
playing fearlessly since he was a kid.
He hit a home run in his first college at bat, and for those two don’t
remember, he came off the bench as a pinch-hitter in games 1 and 2 of the 2011
World Series, and delivered singles in the ole RISP, 2 Out situation becoming
the only player with 2 go-ahead RBI’s as a pinch hitter in the history of the World
Series. And these were his first two
at-bats in World Series play. So I ask
you again. Is this an unpredictable
trend, or perhaps is there something to “The Allen Craig Theory”. They
say time always tells, but time has already told us.
